EU Confronts Structural Contradictions in Defense Efforts Amid Shifting Security Landscape

A host of European Union (EU) leaders were in Armenia on Monday and Tuesday for two summits as the Caucasian country, long considered to be aligned with Russia, stepped up its outreach towards the West. Armenia appears to be rethinking its security architecture, especially after the 2023 Azerbaijani takeover of the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region despite the presence of Russian peacekeepers. But these summits also come at a time when the European grouping faces questions over its own security mechanisms amid tensions with the US over the Iran war and tariffs. For decades, Europe has depended heavily on American military protection. As the US signals a reduction in troops, the EU faces a difficult question: can it defend itself effectively as a block? The difficulty lies in its very structure, designed to suppress centralised power — especially military power. Here’s a look at its structural contradictions that have complicated its task of forming and executing a unified defence framework. The history of European groupings Following World War II, the deployment of US military personnel was commonly perceived as the ultimate deterrent against aggression in the region. With their security dependent on American hard power, European nations focused their resources on economic recovery and social welfare. In 1951, six countries created the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), laying the foundation of what would later become the EU. The ECSC evolved into the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957. These bodies primarily worked toward economic prosperity and regulation in the region while minimising the risk of another European war through the adoption of a supranationalist model. The EU is simultaneously built on two competing political models: supranationalism and intergovernmentalism. A supranational system allows a central authority to enforce a unified strategy that would be binding on all member states. An intergovernmental system, however, leaves the final authority with national governments. This can allow a single dissenting country’s veto to paralyse the entire group. The tug-of-war between the two systems plays out across the EU’s four core bodies: The European Commission (supranational): This is the executive branch of the EU. It proposes legislation, manages the bloc’s daily business and is meant to represent the interests of the EU as a whole, rather than the interests of individual member states. The European Parliament (supranational): It is the directly elected voice of the citizens. The body acts as a co-legislator on economic and civil matters. It has, however, been historically sidelined in matters of defence policy. The European Council (intergovernmental): Comprising the heads of state or government from every member country, this institution defines the bloc’s strategic direction and political priorities. The Council of Ministers/Council of the EU (intergovernmental): This is where national ministers negotiate and adopt laws. In the realm of foreign policy and defence, this body operates on strict unanimity. The Principal-Agent framework In 2016, the EU’s Global Strategy marked a departure from soft-power idealism towards ‘Principled pragmatism’. The strategy doctrine dictates pragmatically protecting the EU’s security interests. Its execution however remains somewhat unfruitful. British political scientist Simon Hix describes the EU’s problem through the “Principal-Agent” framework. Member states are the “principals” that delegate tasks to the “agent” — usually the European Commission. In areas such as trade, the Commission has broad authority to negotiate on behalf of all EU members. But member states are reluctant to hand over control in matters of defence because security and foreign policy are expressions of national sovereignty and affect domestic politics. The EEAS problem The European External Action Service (EEAS), created to coordinate EU foreign policy, also faces limits. Although designed to promote a unified diplomatic position, its actions are frequently blocked or diluted by member states pursuing their own interests . A well-known example came in 2020, when Cyprus delayed EU sanctions against Belarus over election crackdowns because it wanted stronger action against Turkey on unrelated disputes. This ability of one member state to veto collective action often paralyses the EU’s response during crises. Ultimately, this fragmentation is why national capitals bypass the EEAS and defaulted towards NATO for security guarantees. This dynamic is starkly visible when examining national defence outlays against NATO’s baseline targets, proving that military prioritisation remains a heavily siloed, domestic calculation rather than a unified European endeavour. Command vacuum The EU has a ‘Dual-Executive’ system — the President of the European Council builds consensus between heads of state and the President of the Commission oversees policy implementation. But there’s no executive hub to coordinate rapid military responses, such as a commander-in-chief. As a result, even urgent security decisions can spark lengthy political negotiations and compromises. The EU is therefore unable to bridge the gap between economic weight and hard-power projection. Need for unanimity In 2009, the EU formulated the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). It prohibits the Commission from issuing declarations of security threats or forcing action from member states. This power rests exclusively with the Council of Ministers and operates on absolute unanimity between members. This ensures that centralised EU forces cannot bypass the sovereign will of a member state. So, even if 26 of 27 members agree to deploy forces, the veto by a single member will freeze any military movement. The EU Battlegroups plan demonstrates the perils of intergovernmentalist vetoes. Established in 2007, these were to be multinational rapid reaction units for deployment. They have, however, never been deployed. Member states would squabble over who would foot the bill, or domestic political pressures in one or two capitals would force a veto. Fragmented procurement The EU also struggles with joint military procurement and defence industrialisation. The European Commission holds regulatory power over the central EU budget which includes the European Defence Fund. But national governments continue to protect their domestic defence industries. This compromises interoperability while introducing duplicated equipment within the various sovereign armies of the EU. This framework has resulted in a staggering variety of weapons systems in Europe compared to the US. European armies operate dozens of different types of main battle tanks and armoured carriers, also increasing the cost of running practice exercises. As Washington threatens to pull back its security umbrella, the EU shall inevitably be forced to confront its structural contradictions which trap them in a strategic straitjacket incapable of fielding a cohesive army.