The talks between the US and Iranian delegations in Islamabad concluded early Sunday without a breakthrough. The negotiations to end the war in West Asia lasted 21 hours amid a fragile truce brokered by Pakistan. The parties dispersed without a settlement owing to an atmosphere of distrust and deadlocks. Tehran labelled Washington’s demands as “excessive.” Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf, who led the Iranian delegation, said the US “ultimately failed to gain the trust of the Iranian delegation.” US President Donald Trump announced that US Navy will now block all ships looking to pass through the Strait of Hormuz, but also asserted that the Iranian side hadn’t left the bargaining table. But will Iran talk to US again after the Islamabad failure? Following the meeting, Iran’s foreign ministry spokesperson Esmaeil Baghaei told a local news outlet that common ground was found on several issues but that “on two, three key topics there were significant differences and, ultimately, the talks did not lead to an agreement.” Details about the deadlocks have also emerged. US and Iranian media houses have reported three major sticking points: The US has been pushing Iran to reopen the Strait of Hormuz and restore the pre-war status quo. Iran effectively blocked trade through this critical waterway during the conflict by targeting vessels and laying mines – a move that triggered a global energy crunch and gave Tehran significant bargaining power. Tehran sought to legitimise its control over the Strait at the negotiation table, demanding US recognition of Iran’s sovereignty over the maritime route, according to its 10-point proposal. However, under the International Maritime Organization’s (IMO) Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS), both westbound and eastbound shipping lanes lie entirely within the territorial waters of Oman, contrary to Tehran’s assertions in recent social media posts. Notably, the maritime borders were established in a treaty between Iran and Oman in July 1974, and the countries joined the IMO in June 1958 and July 1974, respectively. Most importantly, unlike the Suez Canal, navigation along the Strait of Hormuz is governed by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which stipulates free, unhindered navigation for all vessels transiting the Strait. Regardless, Tehran has reportedly leveraged its position by charging $2 million for each vessel transiting the chokepoint by diverting maritime traffic around Iran’s Larak Island — a route reportedly free of mines, according to a map issued by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Iran has reportedly sought to use the revenue as reparations for the war. Moreover, Tehran utilised its grip over the channel to cleave existing faultlines between Washington and its partners by allowing ships belonging to India, Pakistan, Iraq, Japan, Korea and France to pass through. Thus far, Hormuz been has the most powerful negotiation tool on the table. During the conflict, a parliamentary commission in Iran approved plans to impose tolls on vessels transiting the Strait – a direct challenge to the Gulf Arab states’ influence in the region. According to reports, Tehran also suggested splitting the toll collected with Oman. The US has demanded that Iran completely dismantle its uranium enrichment programme — the core of Tehran’s latent nuclear weapons capability. Iran has insisted on its sovereign right to enrichment as a signatory of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and keeping their nuclear programme running for power generation. However, Washington doubts its intentions. While there are several nuclear facilities in Iran, Bushehr is the only functional power plant. More importantly, Iran reportedly possesses approximately 450 kilograms of 60 per cent-enriched uranium, which is convertible to weapons-grade (90 per cent-enriched) uranium within weeks. The enrichment level is far beyond the required level for power generation (& gt ;5 per cent), and the amount is enough to more than 10 nuclear bombs, according to an estimate cited by Axios. Earlier, Oman’s Foreign Minister Hamad Al Busaidi said that Tehran had conceded to several of Washington’s demands before the war broke out on February 28. The demands included zero stockpiling of nuclear material, down-blending its existing 60 per cent enriched stockpile to irreversible fuel, and allowing US inspectors access to Iranian nuclear sites. But the US and Israel conducted the strikes anyway, which may be the reason behind the trust deficit today. Notably, US President Donald Trump turned down the proposal of his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin , to transfer the nuclear material to Moscow, which would have resolved the deadlock before both decided to reach the negotiation table. The Indian Express reported earlier that Tehran has demanded that Washington release $27 billion in frozen revenues, including oil revenues held in Iraq, Luxembourg, Bahrain, Japan, Qatar, Turkey and Germany. The Iranians argued that releasing the frozen assets and providing sanctions relief would help them rebuild after the war. Similarly, in 2015, Iran regained access to more than $100 billion in frozen assets after the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Iran had agreed to significantly limit its nuclear programme, cap uranium enrichment at 3.67%, and allow foreign inspection of its nuclear sites. Both parties expressed readiness to continue the discussions. “We leave here with a very simple proposal: a method of understanding that is our final and best offer…We’ll see if the Iranians accept it,” said US Vice President JD Vance, who was leading the delegation. After the meeting, Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf said it was the “time for the US to decide whether it can earn our trust or not.”
US-Iran Talks in Islamabad Conclude Without Breakthrough Amid Distrust and Deadlocks
Indian Express•

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Publisher: Indian Express
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