Saudi-Pakistani-Turkish Collective Defense Pact Sparks Concerns of 'Islamic NATO'
The Saudi-Pakistani-Turkish collective defence pact’s operative sentence, “an armed attack on one signatory shall be regarded as an attack against them all”, immediately triggered talk of an “Islamic NATO”, albeit a Sunni one, as it appeared to combine Turkish defence technology, Pakistani military prowess and strategic arsenal, and Saudi oil-financial power. Last year, shortly after the Israeli strike on Hamas in Doha, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan had signed a “Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement” at Riyadh. That, too, had contained a NATO Article 5-type declaration, “an attack on one will be treated as an attack on both,” though that wasn’t invoked when Iran and its assets attacked Riyadh and its energy infrastructure. The US, prioritising Israel, failed to protect Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states from strikes by Iran and its allies, with the latter disrupting energy shipments. Turkey, a NATO ally with a large military, has often criticised Israel over Gaza, hosted Hamas political figures, and drifted from NATO and the US. Given Israel’s increasingly aggressive military stance, for Saudi Arabia and Turkey, this trilateral collective-defence pact is a hedge against Israel. The US-Israeli war, allegedly waged to “prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons,” may end up providing the imperative for Iran to “go nuclear”. Pakistan, dependent on Gulf remittances and Saudi funds, is the only Muslim country with nuclear weapons. There are multiple layers to this new pact. Pakistan and Turkey label their relationship as historic and fraternal, rooted in shared religion, culture, and strategic interests. Their defence relationship started from foundational military training, joint exercises and dialogues in the 1990s, and evolved into co-development and upgrading of vital platforms. Facing US-European arms restrictions and shifting regional security dynamics, both countries have forged strategic alliances. Ankara has also supported Islamabad on Kashmir. The Pakistan-Saudi relationship, too, is close. While the Saudis have enough money to buy the latest weaponry, the institutional weaknesses typical in authoritarian monarchies (not national armies, but armies of ruling families) led to Pakistan stepping in. Beginning with the 1951 Treaty of Friendship, their defence relationship gained incremental traction, from Pakistan providing training and advisory support to the Royal Saudi Air Force, to regular deployment of military personnel in Saudi Arabia. Post-9/11, both nations reinforced military and intelligence cooperation. From 2021, the Biden administration pursued a tripartite framework linking the civil nuclear deal to the Saudis normalising relations with Israel via the Abraham Accords. But with Israel dramatically shifting the regional security paradigm, Saudi Arabia, which has traditionally tied its recognition of Israel to Palestinian statehood, hardened its stance. On July 22, the US-Saudi civil nuclear agreement , a 30-year bilateral pact allowing US firms to build and support civilian nuclear reactors in Saudi Arabia, was signed. The next day, in an abrupt turnabout, President Donald Trump declared the Saudis would have to normalise relations with Israel first. Saudi Arabia, which is a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty but has yet to sign the additional protocol to its 2009 safeguards agreement with the IAEA, has long been linked, indirectly, to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme. Pakistan must also be looking at this pact to check India militarily. India’s MEA has stated that it is “closely following” the development. As of now, neither the treaty nor its protocols have been published; there is no clarity on the joint command of forces, rules of engagement, intelligence-sharing architecture, and importantly, the procedure for invoking that operative clause. Yet, India cannot be complacent. New Delhi needs to engage Saudi Arabia and Turkey more, while deepening ties with other Gulf states (which may join this pact) and resuscitating its own groupings like the Quad. The writer, a retired Army officer, was the principal director in the National Security Council Secretariat
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